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Abstract
The 2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement in the National Hockey League limits
contracts offered to free agents in terms of length and variance in yearly salary. These changes
have made finding undervalued free agents even more important to teams’ general managers.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate players and teams with both traditional and advanced
metrics to determine how players are valued in comparison to their impact on their team’s
performance.
A team’s winning percentage is hypothesized to be a function of shooting percentage and
save percentage, as well as proxies for puck possession time, such as shots on goal per game,
shots against per game, blocked shots, missed shots, and face-off percentage. It is also
hypothesized that players with higher puck possession attributes will impact a team’s winning
percentage to a greater extent than those with lower metrics, and so should be a key factor in
determining how general managers use available salary money to improve their team.
Based on data from NHL.com and stats.hockeyanalysis.com, we estimate team
performance of all 30 NHL teams for each of the six previous seasons of play (2007-2013) as a
function of puck possession proxies. We find that puck possession proxies significantly impact a
team’s winning percentage and that free agents with higher performance metrics have a
significantly greater impact on team performance.
performance as much as several less expensive players in cases that a team lacks depth.

i

Glossary
Shots on Goal (SoG): Number of Shots per game that reach the opponents net, including all
goals and shots that would have resulted in goals had the opposing goaltender not made a
save
Shots Against (SAoG): Number of Shots per game taken by an opponent that reach a
team’s net, including all goals and shots that would have resulted in goals had the
goaltender not made a save
Shot Percentage (SP): (Goals)/(Shots on Goal)
Save Percentage (SVP): (Saves)/(Shots on Goal)
Blocked Shots (BSG): Any shot attempted by an opponent and blocked by a player other
than the goaltender
Missed Shots (MSG): Any attempted shot that does not reach the net and is not blocked
Corsi (Cor): Total shots per game (Shots on Goal, Missed Shots, Blocked Shots) by a team
or player
Corsi Percentage (CP): (Total Shots)/(Total Shots + Total Shots Against)
Fenwick (Fen): Shots on Goal plus Missed Shots (Corsi minus Blocked Shots) by a team or
player
Fenwick Percentage (FP): (Fenwick)/(Fenwick + Opponents’ Fenwick)
Face-Off Percentage (FOP): (Team Face-Offs won)/(Total Face-Offs)

ii

Table of Contents
List of Exhibits

v

Chapter One: Introduction
Purpose of Study
Hypothesis
Outline of Study

1

Chapter Two: Institutional Framework of Professional Hockey
The 2013 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement
Player Development and Organizational Depth

4

Chapter Three: Measures and Determinants of Team Performance
Point Percentage: A Measure of Team Performance
Determinants of Performance
Sabermetrics: Fenwick and Corsi
Traditional Statistics
Roles within a Hockey Team
Team Chemistry and Variance
Regression Model

10

Chapter Four: Evaluation of Statistics as Determinants of Team Performance
16
Sources and Measurement of Data
Regression Results for Determinants of Team Performance
Case Study 1: The Pittsburgh Penguins acquisition of James Neal
Case Study 2: The Chicago Blackhawks, Multiple Stanley Cups in Study Period
Case Study 3: Columbus Blue Jackets Improvement in the 2012 Off-Season
Case Study 4: Stanley Cup Finalists from Past Six Seasons
Chapter Five: Conclusion
Interpretation of Findings
Policy Remarks
Suggestions for Further Research

32

Bibliography

36

Appendix A
Appendix B

39
40

iii

List of Exhibits
Exhibit 1: NHL CBA Hockey Related Revenue

5

Exhibit 2: Calculation of Point Percentage

10

Exhibit 3: Simplified Roles of Players

13

Exhibit 4: Descriptive Statistics

17

Exhibit 5: Performance Indicator Regressions

18

Exhibit 6: 2009-10 Chicago Blackhawks Roster

21

Exhibit 7: 2012-13 Chicago Blackhawks Roster

22

Exhibit 8: Chicago Blackhawks Core Players

23

Exhibit 9: Blue Jackets Trade Nash to Rangers Detailed

25

Exhibit 10: Columbus Blue Jackets Goaltending Statistics

26

Exhibit 11: Estimated Point Percentage Change Attributable to Sergei Bobrovsky

27

Exhibit 12: Past Six Stanley Cup Finals

28

Exhibit 13: Descriptive Statistics of Stanley Cup Finalists

29

iv

Chapter 1
Introduction
Purpose of the Study
The ultimate goal of every professional sports franchise is to win the league
championship. Every general manager is tasked with assembling a team that will ultimately
contend for a playoff title. Obviously, the task can be long or short term. This is the reason
many teams will trade a star player for prospects as it increases the probability for success
in the future while the team’s immediate success may be hindered. The signing of players
by any general manager has many factors; however, insight into how specific players help a
team win is certainly paramount. Sabermetrics attempt to quantify how a player or players
impact a team’s performance. The field of sabermetrics has grown in recent years with the
success of the Oakland Athletics and Boston Red Sox and has increasingly proliferated into
sports other than baseball.1 Because advanced statistical analysis can help general
managers make decisions on how to allocate dollars when being confined by a salary cap, it
is of critical importance when determining how to build a team. It is most critical in leagues
that institute a ‘hard’ salary cap, as the National Hockey League (NHL) implemented in the
2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In the National Hockey League, the ultimate
goal of every team is to win the Stanley Cup.
The purpose of this study is to determine correlations of performance statistics to
point percentage as well as how NHL general managers can use this information to make
decisions on acquiring players in free agency and through trades. The study shifts focus
away from the obvious drivers of players’ salaries such as goals and assists, and on to puck
1
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possession statistics in order to find value where other general managers may not be
looking.
The research is critical, as NHL general managers have had contract limits imposed
with the 2013 Collective Bargaining Agreement. This has eliminated loopholes used by
general managers when signing free agents. Understanding the nature of free agency and
what types of signings have had significant impacts on team performance will better inform
general managers about the value that can be added to their team in the free agent market.
For this reason, a detailed study of Stanley Cup Finalists over the past six years will be
analyzed to better understand how the teams were put together. In addition, specific case
studies will be analyzed to determine how free agent signings and/or trades may have
impacted the team’s performance.

Outline of the Study
In the second chapter we present the institutional and historical context of
managing a professional hockey organization. We first discuss critical changes in the last
two NHL Collective Bargaining Agreements, including an introduction to the rules and
regulations of how hockey players are acquired by clubs, as well as organizational salary
caps and player contract limits. We then explain of how the minor league system impacts
the NHL club.
In the third chapter we examine team performance statistics that may positively or
negatively impact point percentage. This includes finding an adequate proxy for puck
possession. Other statistics that we analyze include face-offs, turnovers, shots for and
against, save percentage, and shooting percentage. This analytical framework provides the
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context for a model in which future team performance can be analyzed, as well as a
framework for what types of players may have a higher impact on team performance.
In the fourth chapter we introduce the sources for the sample data. We estimate
team performance statistics through the model to determine magnitudes of impact on
point percentage. Next, we analyze the regression results. Finally, we analyze the impact of
puck possession for Stanley Cup finalists and teams that experienced drastic improvement
in winning percentage from one year to the next.
In the fifth chapter we conclude that advanced statistics can be used in order to
inform general about player acquisitions. We determine that the best teams have built their
core in the draft while acquiring role players in free agency.

3

Chapter 2
The NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement and Framework of Professional Hockey
The 2013 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement
The NHL established a ‘hard’ salary cap after a lockout cancelled the 2004-05
season. Previously, the NHL did not institute any salary cap, and was the last of the major
North American sports to institute a salary cap or luxury tax in order to control players’
salaries. The hard salary cap prevents any club from exceeding a payroll limit for any
reason, and differs from a ‘soft’ salary cap, which allows teams to exceed the limit but with
a penalty such as a luxury tax. When the 2005 CBA expired in September of 2012 owners
wanted to make it easier to fill rosters without inflating salaries further. This caused the
league to create a new calculation of the salary cap based on league revenue, cutting the
salary cap from $64.3 million in 2011-12 to $60 million in 2012-13. The salary cap will
move back up to $64.3 million for the 2013-14 season, in essence creating a two-year
freeze on salary inflation.2 The new formula estimates league revenue for the upcoming
season. The league separates its revenue streams into “hockey-related revenue” and
“non-hockey-related revenue”.
Of importance to the salary cap calculation is hockey-related revenue. Exhibit 1 is a
list of what is deemed hockey-related revenue under the 2013 NHL CBA.

2

NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013
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Exhibit 1: NHL CBA Hockey Related Revenue
1) NHL Regular Season & Playoff Gate Receipts
2) Pre-Season Games
3) Special Games (International Exhibition Games, etc)
4) NHL National, International and National Digital Broadcasts
5) NHL Networks
6) Local Cable Television Broadcasts
7) Local Pay-Per-View, Satellite and Other Broadcasts
8) Local Over-the-Air Television Broadcasts
9) Local Radio Broadcasts
10) Club Internet
11) Publications
12) In-Arena Novelty Sales
13) Non-Arena Novelty Sales
14) Concessions
15) Luxury Boxes/Suites
16) Club/Premium Seats
17) Fixed Signage/Arena Sponsorships
18) Temporary Signage/Club Sponsorships
19) Dasherboards
20) Parking
21) Other Revenues (sale of game-worn jerseys, skills competitions, open practices, etc)

Fifty percent of hockey related revenue is allowed for player salaries, down from 57
percent in the previous CBA. From there a “midpoint” for the projected salary range is
estimated. The salary cap is set at 15 percent above the midpoint, while the floor is set at
15 percent below the midpoint. The range between the salary cap and salary floor for NHL
teams is not to be under $16 million and is not to exceed $28 million. With a tighter budget
in terms of player salaries, NHL general managers must be able to make more informed
decisions than ever on what signings will help their organization the most as they have
fewer dollars to build their teams.
The smaller cap is compounded by the elimination of contract length loopholes that
allowed general managers to lure attractive free agents more easily. Previously, the NHL
allowed general managers to sign players to extremely long contracts in order to
circumvent the salary cap. For example, Lou Lamoriello of the New Jersey Devils signed
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forward Ilya Kovalchuk to a 15-year, $100 million contract in 2010.3 About $80 million was
to be paid within the first 8 years of the contract, but because the cap hit of a player takes
into account the average salary made by the player over the length of the contract,
Kovalchuk’s “cap hit” was $6,666,667.4 In response, the 2013 CBA limits contract lengths to
seven years (eight years if the team is re-signing its own player). In addition, the NHL also
included a contract variance rule. Player salaries cannot vary by more than 35% from one
year to the next, while the lowest annual salary earned by a player cannot be less than 50%
of the highest annual salary earned by the player under the same contract.
General managers must also deal with several forms of free agency. Based on a
player’s age and NHL games played, a player may be considered restricted or unrestricted.
Any player that is 27 years old or older or has 7 years of NHL experience is considered an
unrestricted free agent. Unrestricted free agents are able to sign with any NHL club for any
salary, so long as the team’s payroll does not exceed the salary cap and does not exceed the
limit of 50 contracted players. Restricted free agents can obtain qualifying offers from other
teams—it is then the choice of the player’s previous team to match the qualifying offer and
keep the player or to let him sign the offering.5
In addition, the NHL CBA limits the contracts of entry-level players. Any player
signing their first contract and under the age of 25 is subject to these limits. Length of the
contract is determined by age. If the player is 21 or under, the length must be 3 years; if the
player is 22 or 23, the contract length is 2 years while 24-year-olds receive a one-year
contract. The maximum salary for an entry-level player is $925,000 while the minimum is
Mazzeo, Mike. 2013
Capgeek.com. 2013
5 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013
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the same as the league minimum of $525,000.6 Entry-level contracts must be two-way. This
means the player makes substantially less money if he is placed in the minor leagues;
however, he cannot be claimed off waivers when the NHL team assigns him to the minor
leagues.
All NHL contracts are guaranteed. This means that waiving or cutting a player does
not free a team from financial obligations to the player’s salary. NHL teams are allowed to
buyout the remainder of a player’s contract. A player can be bought out of his contract for
one-third of his remaining salary due if he is under the age of 26. If the player is over 26, he
must be paid two-thirds of his remaining salary. The team has two times the length of the
remaining contract to make these payments. The buyout amount is calculated in the teams
salary cap limit evenly across the length of the buyout payments.7
Teams acquiring a player through a trade must assume at least half of the player’s
remaining salary. A previous team can only retain a player’s salary twice over the course of
the contract and the retained salary cannot exceed 15 percent of the upper salary cap limit.
Finally, a team is only allowed three retained contracts to be on its books at a particular
time and is not allowed to renegotiate player contracts if the player was acquired in a trade.
These rules were put in place in order to prevent wealthier teams from acquiring players
and evading salary cap rules.8
The restrictions introduced in the 2005 NHL CBA and enhanced in the 2013 NHL
CBA has made every dollar a general manager spends more important. In addition, the
closing of many loopholes has made the idea of finding a ‘diamond in the rough’ much more
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013
NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013
8 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement. 2013
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fruitful as the new CBA has made it more difficult to acquire a large number of players
valued highly in the market. With a defined amount of money, general managers must be
able to decide firstly what areas of the team need to be improved and the value of players
available in free agency to fill the team’s needs. The depth of the organization’s prospect
pool compounds these decisions further.

Player Development and Organizational Depth
Every NHL team has an affiliate team in the American Hockey League (AHL). The
AHL is considered the premier minor hockey league, only being topped in skill level by the
NHL. The AHL is used as a “farm system” for the NHL. On opening day of the 2013 season,
630 players on NHL rosters had played in the AHL, accounting for 84 percent of all NHL
players.9 NHL rosters are not to exceed 23 healthy players; however, teams are allowed up
to 50 players under contract. Most players under contract, but not on the NHL roster, are
on the AHL roster. This allows the organization to easily fill roster spots vacated by injury
or poor performance.
The AHL allows organizations to develop prospects, acquired in the draft or through
trades and free agency. For smaller market teams it is imperative to develop players as
many of their high-end players will sign with another team when they become free agents.
Although all teams are bound by the salary cap and the 50-contract limit, large market
teams hold in advantage in attracting high-priced free agents as they often have greater
revenues from ticket and merchandise sales. This allows large market teams to pay more
for the services of a star player. However, star players are often overpriced. Although goals
9
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and assists are valued the most in the free agent market, it is entirely possible a player who
is a 30-goal scorer with one team scores only 10 goals with another team the next year.
Other metrics must be studied to determine how a general manager can spend money most
efficiently. Ultimately, every NHL team’s goal is to win the Stanley Cup. The goal of this
study is to determine how a general manager can build a potential Stanley Cup-winning
team with limited resources.

9

Chapter 3
Measures and Determinants of Team Performance
Point Percentage: A Measure of Team Performance
Point percentage in the NHL is defined differently from winning percentage in other
leagues. The NHL awards 2 points for a win, 1 point for an overtime or shootout loss, and 0
points for a regulation loss. Exhibit 2 shows how point percentage is calculated.
Exhibit 2: Calculation of Point Percentage
Point Percentage = Total Points
Total Possible Points
Total Possible Points = 2*Games Played
Point Percentage = Total Points
2*Games Played

Point percentage is used in the NHL because losing a game may still gain a team a point in
the standings. This is due to the NHL no longer allowing ties, yet still awarding points to a
team that did not lose in regulation. This is the most effective measure of team
performance over an entire season as a team’s point total determines whether or not it
makes the playoffs and has a chance to compete for the Stanley Cup.

Determinants of Performance
Sabermetrics: Fenwick and Corsi
Sabermetrics is the term used to describe the empirical examination of sports
centered on statistical analysis. The scientific analysis of baseball was first put in the
national spotlight in 1964 when Earnshaw Cook published Percentage Baseball. Although,
10

originally dismissed by Major League Baseball teams, the field gained traction through the
second half of the 20th century with the work of Bill James who coined the term
sabermetrics itself. Baseball lent itself to statistical analysis because of the nature of the
game—it is a one-on-one game within a team sport. With the success of open sabermetric
proponents Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics and Theo Epstein of the Boston Red Sox in
the early 2000’s, researchers began attempting to uncover statistical formulas for winning
in other sports.10 This has led to the proliferation of advanced statistics in many sports,
including hockey.
Of particular interest to this study are Fenwick percentage and Corsi percentage,
both of which are statistics used to measure the number of shots attempted by a team.11
Fenwick is defined as shots on goal plus missed shots, while Corsi is defined as all
attempted shots (Fenwick plus blocked shots). These are of particular interest as proxies
for puck possession. In theory, the sport of hockey comes down to puck possession. When
one team has the puck, the other cannot score. Therefore, whoever has the puck more
should have more attempted shots, more scoring chances, more goals, and therefore more
wins. It is important to note that a team does not win because of a high Fenwick or Corsi
percentage, but by the process that a high Fenwick or Corsi percentage requires. This
means a coach should not necessarily preach to shoot the puck from anywhere on the ice.
Yes, this would increase both the team’s Fenwick and Corsi percentages; however, it
renders them useless as a puck possession proxy. Fenwick and Corsi percentages compare
the amount of attempted shots by a team and their opponents.12 Because the percentages
Fry, Michael J., and Jeffery W. Ohlmann. 2012
Wagner, Daniel. 2013
12 stats.hockeyanalysis.com. 2013
10
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contain both an offensive and defensive aspect, they will be used in the regression models.
However, Fenwick and Corsi percentages are not available specifically for players and
therefore players will be compared in terms of Fenwick of Corsi per game. As puck
possession proxies their merits should still hold as a player who has higher Fenwick or
Corsi values allows his opponents less time with the puck.

Traditional Statistics
Just as Fenwick and Corsi are theorized to be correlated to point percentage,
traditional statistics that contribute to puck possession are hypothesized to impact a team’s
success. Traditional statistics that impact puck possession include face-off percentage,
turnovers, and takeaways. The fewer turnovers a team commits, the longer it will have the
puck. Similarly the more takeaways and face-offs won by a team will contribute to more
puck possession. These statistics are not considered drivers of players’ salaries; however,
they could have a large impact on the success of a team.
Shots on goal and shots against on goal are both taken into account in Fenwick
percentage and Corsi percentage, and for this reason they will not be included in the
regression model. However, shooting percentage and save percentage are not intrinsic to
Fenwick or Corsi and therefore will be included in the regression model.
Statistics that have a large impact on both salaries and the success of a team are
goals and assists. It makes the most sense as the more goals a team scores, the more games
that team is likely to win. However, we are concerned about metrics that may relate to
more goals for and fewer against, therefore improving point percentage. Because goals and
goals against are obviously correlated to wins and because players known as goal scorers
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are able to obtain high salaries, both goals and assists will not be included in the regression
model. Because goal scorers are often the highest paid players in the NHL a general
manager could be better off to acquire multiple players for the same price as a single star
player. This is dependant on the types of players already on a roster.

Roles within a Hockey Team
One reason sabermetrics are successful in analyzing baseball is because the basic
role of every batter is the same and the basic role of every pitcher is the same. Batters are
tasked with getting on base, while pitchers keep them off the bases. It is an individual game
within a team game. This is very different from hockey in which five players on a team need
to work as a unit to score and prevent the other team from doing so. The sixth player, the
goaltender, is the only player tasked with only one job—prevent the opponent from
scoring. Because of the fluidity and teamwork involved in hockey, players have different
roles. They are broken down in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3: Simplified Roles of Players
Position
Skilled Forwards
Two-Way Forwards
Offensive Defensemen
Defensive Defensemen
Goaltenders

Task
Score, top two lines most often
Prevent opponenent from scoring, occasionally score
Create scoring opportunities, prevent opp. scoring
Prevent opponent from scoring
Prevent opponent from scoring

Salary
High
Moderate to Low
High to Moderate
Moderate to Low
High to Low

Because teams may have different numbers of different types of players, general managers
can easily value the same player differently. For example, a team with only one offensive
defenseman would most likely value a second more than a team that already has three
offensive defensemen. Because only two defensemen are on the ice at a time, the fourth
offensive defensemen offers a lower return than the second.
13

Team Chemistry and Variance
Along with different roles, players themselves may fit differently in one team
compared to another. For example, an offensive player may not perform as well under a
coach who stresses defense. Similarly, a player may put up great numbers when playing on
the same line as one teammate, yet be less productive when playing with others. These
“chemistry factors” and others may create a substantial amount of variance that is
extremely difficult to quantify.

Regression Model
Both sabermetrics and traditional statistics will be used in the regression models.
The first model will include Fenwick percentage while the second will include Corsi
percentage. They will not be included together because they are highly correlated. The
regression model is based on the model used by Hakes and Sauer (2007).

Regression Model:
PP = α + β1Proxy + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG + ε

Where: PP = Point Percentage; Proxy = Puck Possession; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game

Point percentage is the most viable and readily available measurement of team
performance and is therefore used as the dependent variable in both models. The model
will estimate the impact of each performance statistic on point percentage and therefore
indicate what statistics should be heavily valued in the free agent market. This will allow
general managers to make informed decisions on how a certain player may impact the
14

team’s performance. In the models, we expect coefficients on Proxy, CP, FOP, SP, SVP, and
TAG to be positive and the coefficient on TOG to be negative.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation of Statistics as Determinants of Team Performance
Sources and Measurement of Data
The data comes from the 2007-08 Season through the 2012-13 Season. The 2012-13
Season was shortened by a lockout and therefore measurements are evaluated on a ‘per
game’ basis in order to eliminate any bias. The 2007-08 Season was the first season in
which advanced statistics such as Corsi and Fenwick are readily available. All thirty NHL
franchises are observed in each season’s data set.
Data collected for each team includes: Fenwick percentage, Corsi percentage, faceoff
percentage, shooting percentage, save percentage, turnovers per game, takeaways per
game, powerplay time and the dependent variable, point percentage. Fenwick percentage
and Corsi percentage are collected from stats.hockeyanalysis.com13 while all other
statistics are from the NHL’s website.14 The descriptive statistics are reported in Exhibit 4.

13
14

stats.hockeyanalysis.com. 2013
www.nhl.com/ice/teamstats.htm. 2013
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Exhibit 4: Descriptive Statistics
Point Percentage
Takeaways per Game
Mean
55.858 Mean
Standard Deviation
7.963 Standard Deviation
Minimum
37.200 Minimum
Maximum
80.200 Maximum
Shooting Percentage
Turnovers per Game
Mean
7.766 Mean
Standard Deviation
0.881 Standard Deviation
Minimum
5.490 Minimum
Maximum
10.520 Maximum
Save Percentage
Corsi Percentage
Mean
92.229 Mean
Standard Deviation
0.952 Standard Deviation
Minimum
89.320 Minimum
Maximum
94.470 Maximum
Faceoff Percentage
Fenwick Percentage
Mean
49.996 Mean
Standard Deviation
2.025 Standard Deviation
Minimum
44.200 Minimum
Maximum
56.400 Maximum

6.843
1.405
1.000
11.560
8.062
1.857
4.460
12.870
49.991
3.269
41.900
59.500
49.961
3.219
41.300
59.700

Determinants of Team Performance
In order to determine the impact of each performance statistic on a team’s winning
percentage, two basic regressions are used. The first utilizes Fenwick percentage as the
proxy for puck possession, while the second uses Corsi percentage as the proxy for puck
possession:
Equation 1:
PP = α + β1FP + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG + ε

Where: PP = Point Percentage; FP = Fenwick Percentage; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game

Equation 2:
PP = α + β1CP + β2FOP + β3SP + β4SVP + β5TOG + β6TAG + ε

Where: PP = Point Percentage; CP = Corsi Percentage; FOP = Face-off Percentage; SP = Shooting
Percentage; SVP = Save Percentage; TOG = Turnover per Game; TAG = Takeaways per Game

The results are shown in Exhibit 5.
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Exhibit 5: Performance Indicator Regressions
Dependent Variable: Point Percentage
Sample Size: 180 Mean Dependent Variable: 55.85833

Equat

Constant

1

−398.731
(−11.64)

2

−367.927
(−10.19)

Fenwick
Pct
1.617
(13.75)

Corsi
Pct

1.505
(12.15)

Face-off
Pct
0.1423
(0.772)

Shooting
Pct
3.831
(9.727)

Save
Pct
3.661
(10.21)

Turnovers
Per Game

Takeaways
Per Game

R2

0.1302
(0.685)

-0.2659
(-1.066)

0.701

0.1502
(0.758)

3.721
(8.907)

3.405
(8.965)

0.0593
(0.294)

-0.3539
(-1.338)

0.662

Source: Appendix A

Both regressions show the relationship between performance statistics and point
percentage using a linear model. Model 1 has a higher R2 value than Model 2, suggesting
Fenwick percentage is a slightly better predictor of team performance than Corsi
percentage. Model 1 shows us that for every one percent increase in Fenwick Percentage, a
team’s winning percentage increases 1.6 percent, on average, holding all else constant. The
results also show that for every one percent increase in shooting percentage, a team’s
winning percentage increases just under 4 percent on average, while a one percent
increase in save percentage increases a team’s winning percentage by about 3.6 percent on
average, ceteris paribus.
Model 2 shows similar results as Model 1 as for every one percent increase in Corsi
percentage, on average, a team’s winning percentage is estimated to increase 1.5 percent. A
one percent increase in shooting percentage is expected to raise winning percentage by 3.7
percent holding all else constant. Finally a one percent increase in save percentage
increases winning percentage by 3.4 percent on average, holding all else constant.
Face-off percentage, turnovers per game, and takeaways per game did not produce
significant coefficients in either model. NHL general managers can use these results to
18

more efficiently fill the needs of their respective teams. For example, a team with a low
shooting percentage can greatly benefit from acquiring a player or players with high
shooting percentages. This is similar to the situation in our first case study, which shows
that the use of advanced statistics is being used by NHL general managers on making
personnel decisions.

Case Study 1: The Pittsburgh Penguins’ acquisition of James Neal
Before the 2011 trade deadline, the Pittsburgh Penguins were looking to bolster
scoring depth heading into the playoffs. The organizations top two players (Sidney Crosby
and Evgeni Malkin) were both out of the line-up with injuries. Penguins director of player
personnel Dan MacKinnon consulted with The Sports Analytics Institute (SAI), a company
that researches and predicts the results of trades before executing the deal. The Penguins
primary target was forward James Neal who they acquired along with Matt Niskanen for
defenseman Alex Goligoski. Neal was a rising star, however most organizations, including
the Stars did not value him the same way the Penguins and the Sports Analytics Institute
did. The reason was a metric referred to by MacKinnon as “conversion rate.” Neal had an
“ability to produce goals at a high rate based on where he was shooting from, something
SAI analysts Mike Boyle and Kevin Mongeon felt meant he could score far more often if elite
players were getting him the puck in better areas on the ice.”15 This is a more refined
metric comparable to shooting percentage. From the start of the 2011-12 season through
March of the 2013, James Neal had scored the second most goals in the NHL. The Penguins
reached the Eastern Conference finals in the 2013 Stanley Cup Playoffs. MacKinnon claims
15

Mirtle, James. 2013
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the Penguins have not “made an impact decision since then without consulting the
analytics.”16 The case shows how analytics can be used in order to find higher value in
players who might be playing on worse teams and therefore are not valued fairly in the
market. SAI also claims another top-tier NHL team uses their company as a consultant in
personnel decisions. The company uses shot-quality data as well as puck-possession
metrics based on shots attempted in order to predict the number of goals a team will score
over the course of a season.17 The presence of SAI and the impact James Neal’s move to
Pittsburgh has had on the Penguins shows NHL general managers are increasingly aware of
the value of advanced statistics and analytics in personnel decisions.

Case Study 2: The Chicago Blackhawks, Multiple Stanley Cups in Study Period
While the Detroit Red Wings, Pittsburgh Penguins, and Boston Bruins all made two
Stanley Cup Finals appearances (winning once each) in the previous six seasons, only the
Chicago Blackhawks won two Stanley Cups in the past six years. To understand their
success, the team’s roster will be further studied, specifically how players were acquired
and the impact the acquisition types have made in terms of the salary cap. Exhibit 6 is the
Chicago Blackhawk’s roster for the 2009-10 season, with the 25 players in the organization
that played the most games in the NHL that year.

16
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Exhibit 6: 2009-10 Chicago Blackhawks Roster
Player
Position
Acquired
Games
Cap Hit
Entry Level
Burish
F
Draft - 02
13
$712,500
Keith
D
Draft - 02
82
$1,475,000
Seabrook
D
Draft - 03
78
$3,500,000
Byfuglien
F/D
Draft - 03
82
$3,000,000
Bickell
F
Draft - 04
16
$500,000
Bolland
F
Draft - 04
39
$3,375,000
Barker
D
Draft - 04
51
$3,083,333
Brouwer
F
Draft - 04
78
$1,025,000
Hjalmarsson
D
Draft - 05
77
$643,333
Toews
F
Draft - 06
76
$850,000
EL
Kane
F
Draft - 07
82
$875,000
EL
Hendry
D
FA - 06
43
$625,000
Sopel
D
FA - 07
73
$2,333,333
Niemi
G
FA - 08
39
$826,875
Huet
G
FA - 08
48
$5,625,000
Campbell
D
FA - 08
68
$7,142,875
Hossa
F
FA - 09
57
$5,275,000
Kopecky
F
FA - 09
74
$1,200,000
Madden
F
FA - 09
79
$2,750,000
Fraser
F
Trade - 04
70
$700,000
Sharp
F
Trade - 05
82
$3,900,000
Eager
F
Trade - 07
60
$965,000
Versteeg
F
Trade - 07
79
$3,083,333
Ladd
F
Trade - 08
82
$1,550,000
Ebbett
F
Waiver - 09
10
$487,500
Source: http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/stats.htm?gameType=2&season=20092010
Capgeek.com

The 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team featured eleven of the organization’s own draft
picks. Two of those draft picks, Patrick Kane and Jonathan Toews, were still on their entrylevel contracts. This is critical considering Kane accumulated 88 points and a shooting
percentage of 11.5 percent while Toews scored 68 points with a 12.4 percent shooting
percentage. Kane was ranked third on the team with a 13.052 Fenwick rating per game,
while Toews ranked 11th with a 9.162 Fenwick rating per game. The fact that the
Blackhawks were able to establish such strong offensive output from entry-level players
allowed the team to acquire all-star Marian Hossa before the year began, and he led the
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team with a 14.319 Fenwick rating per game.18 The Blackhawks were able to round out the
team in free agency with well-established role players such as Tomas Kopecky and John
Madden. The value added by Toews and Kane far exceeded their value in terms of their
salaries—this allowed the Chicago Blackhawks to fill their roster with the necessary pieces
along side the two young stars and ultimately win the Stanley Cup.
The 2013 Stanley Cup Champion Chicago Blackhawks returned nine players from
the 2010 Championship Team. Those players are italicized in Exhibit 7, which shows the 25
players who played the most games with the Blackhawks that season.
Exhibit 7: 2012-13 Chicago Blackhawks Roster
Player
Position Acquired Games
Cap Hit
Entry Level
Keith
D
Draft - 02
47
$5,538,462
Crawford
G
Draft - 03
30
$2,666,667
Seabrook
D
Draft - 03
47
$5,800,000
Bolland
F
Draft - 04
35
$3,375,000
Bickell
F
Draft - 04
48
$541,667
Hjalmarsson
D
Draft - 05
46
$3,500,000
Toews
F
Draft - 06
47
$6,300,000
Kane
F
Draft - 07
47
$6,300,000
Kruger
F
Draft - 09
47
$735,000
EL
Saad
F
Draft -11
46
$764,167
EL
Shaw
F
Draft -11
48
$577,500
EL
Hossa
F
FA - 09
40
$5,275,000
Mayers
F
FA - 11
19
$600,000
Emery
G
FA - 11
21
$1,150,000
Carcillo
F
FA - 11
23
$825,000
Rozsival
D
FA - 12
27
$2,000,000
Bollig
F
FA -10
25
$575,000
Brookbank
D
FA -12
26
$1,250,000
Sharp
F
Trade - 05
28
$5,900,000
Hayes
F
Trade - 10
10
$654,167
EL
Stalberg
F
Trade - 10
47
$875,000
Leddy
D
Trade - 10
48
$899,999
EL
Frolik
F
Trade - 11
45
$2,333,333
Oduya
D
Trade - 12
48
$3,383,333
Handzus
F
Trade -13
11
$2,500,000
Source: http://blackhawks.nhl.com/club/stats.htm?season=20122013
Capgeek.com
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Again, eleven players on the roster were Chicago Blackhawks’ draft picks. Another
similarity to the 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team is the impact of entry-level players.
The 2013 Blackhawks had five entry-level players. Of particular interest are Brandon Saad
and Nick Leddy. Saad finished the season seventh on the team with a Fenwick per game of
10.956, a mark that bettered Patrick Kane’s 10.731 during the 2012-13 season. Saad
finished the year with a 10.2 shooting percentage and 27 points in the lockout-shortened
season, a mark good for fifth on the team. Meanwhile, Nick Leddy ranked second among
Chicago defenseman in Fenwick per game (5.280) and third in points with 18, only 2 points
behind Brent Seabrook. Sheldon Brookbank, acquired as a free agent prior to the start of
the season, led the defense with a 6.9 Fenwick per game rating. Like the 2010 Stanley Cup
Champion Team, the 2012-13 Blackhawks found a great amount of value in entry-level
players while filling other needs through free agency. The impact of the players returning
from the 2010 Championship Team must also be considered. Exhibit 8 shows the teams
‘core’ players (those returning from the 2009-10 team) salary increases from the previous
2009-10 season.
Exhibit 8: Chicago Blackhawks Core Players
Player
Position 12-13 Cap Hit
09-10 Cap Hit
Keith
D
$5,538,462
$1,475,000
Seabrook
D
$5,800,000
$3,500,000
Bolland
F
$3,375,000
$3,375,000
Bickell
F
$541,667
$500,000
Hjalmarsson
D
$3,500,000
$643,333
Toews
F
$6,300,000
$850,000
Kane
F
$6,300,000
$875,000
Hossa
F
$5,275,000
$5,275,000
Sharp
F
$5,900,000
$3,900,000

Increase
$4,063,462
$2,300,000
$0
$41,667
$2,856,667
$5,450,000
$5,425,000
$0
$2,000,000

Source:Capgeek.com

23

Only two of the Blackhawk’s core players were on the same contract for the 20122013 season as for the 2009-10 season, Marian Hossa and Dave Bolland. Even with no
increase in either Hossa’s or Bolland’s average salary, the Blackhawks paid these nine
returning players an average of $2,459, 644 more per year each in 2012-13. However, the
Blackhawks had not resigned the two highest paid players from the 2010 Stanley Cup
Champhionship Team, defenseman Brian Campbell ($7,142,875 per year) and goaltender
Cristobal Huet ($5,625,000 per year). Jonathan Toews finished fourth in the NHL with 35
points while Kane finished eleventh with 30 points. Both players achieved a shooting
percentage of over 16 percent while Marian Hossa shot at 14 percent. Toews led the core
with a Fenwick per game of 12.75 while Sharp, Hossa, and Kane were all above 10. The
ultimate result was Chicago ranking second in Fenwick Percentage and fifth in shot
percentage among all 30 NHL teams. Goaltenders Corey Crawford, Ray Emery and a strong
defensive corps achieved the eighth ranked save percentage in the NHL.19
Chicago’s success has stemmed from drafting well, and developing these players
along with those acquired early in their careers through trades such as Nick Leddy and
Patrick Sharp in the AHL. This is evident as on average, NHL teams only have 8.5 players on
the active roster drafted by the team—in both Stanley Cup years the Blackhawks have had
11.20 In addition, the performance statistics of entry-level players for the Blackhawks in
both Stanley Cup years have been comparable to veteran players with multi-million dollar
contracts. Harnessing this value added by young players has also allowed the Blackhawks
to gain an edge in performance statistics while remaining under the salary cap.

19
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Case Study 3: Columbus Blue Jackets Improvement in the 2012 Off-Season
The 2011-12 Columbus Blue Jackets finished last place in the entire NHL with a total
of 65 points in an 82 game season, a point percentage of 0.396. Of particular interest is the
fact that the Blue Jackets’ roster included All-Star Rick Nash, who scored 30 goals and
added 29 assists for a total of 59 points. In fact, although Nash had been with the team since
being drafted in 2002, the Blue Jackets only made the playoffs once, losing to the Detroit
Red Wings in the first round of the 2009 Stanley Cup Playoffs.21 Nash was widely sought
after leading up to the 2012 trade deadline, but General Manager Scott Howson did not
move the star player until the off-season. On July 23, 2012, Nash was traded to the New
York Rangers for forwards Brandon Dubinsky and Artem Anisimov, and defenseman Tim
Erixon.22 The players performance statistics for the 2011-12 year and salary cap hit for the
2012-13 season are detailed in Exhibit 9.
Exhibit 9: Blue Jackets Trade Nash to Rangers Detailed
11-12
11-12 Fenwick
11-12
12-13
Player
Points
per Game
Shot Pct
Cap Hit
Rick Nash
59
14.75
8.7
$7,800,000
Brandon Dubinsky
Artem Anisimov
Forward Totals

34
36
70

10.327
8.981
19.308

7.3
9.8
8.55

$4,200,000
$1,875,000
$6,075,000

Tim Erixon
New CBJ Total

2
72

3.141
22.449

0
5.7

$900,000
$6,975,000

Source:Capgeek.com; stats.hockeyanalysis.com

If points are projected solely based on the previous year, the Blue Jackets gained 13
points while increasing the team Fenwick rating by just under 8. It is also important to
consider 2011-12 was Erixon’s rookie season in which he only appeared in 18 games.
When this is coupled with the fact Erixon is a defenseman it is not surprising he did not
21
22
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score a goal. If we exclude Erixon in the analysis and focus solely on forwards, the number
of points scored increases 11, Fenwick per game increases by just over 4.5, shot percentage
decreases by .15% on average, while the Blue Jackets open just under $1 million in cap
space even with the Salary of Erixon included. The extra salary cap space is critical when
considering the Blue Jackets’ other major 2012 off-season roster move.
About a month before the Blue Jackets traded Rick Nash, General Manager Scott
Howson traded three future draft picks to the Philadelphia Flyers for goaltender Sergei
Bobrovsky who had been splitting time with the highest paid goaltender in the NHL during
the 2011-12 season, fellow Russian Ilya Bryzgalov. Bobrovsky came to the Blue Jackets on
the final year of his entry-level contract, with a cap hit of only $900,000.23 His impact on the
Columbus defensive corps was enormous. Exhibit 10 shows the performance statistics and
salaries for Columbus Blue Jackets Goaltenders during the 2011-12 and 2012-13 seasons.
Exhibit 10: Columbus Blue Jackets Goaltending Statistics
2011-12
Games Save Pct GAA
Cap Hit
Steve Mason
46
0.894
3.39
$2,900,000
Curtis Sanford
36
0.911
2.60
$600,000
2012-13
Steve Mason
13
0.899
2.95
$2,900,000
Sergei Bobrovsky
38
0.932
2.00
$900,000
Source: Capgeek.com; NHL.com

During the 2012-13 season, Bobrovsky’s save percentage was .932 while his goals against
average was a mere 2.00. His save percentage was 3.3 percent higher than Steve Mason’s in
2012-13 and 3.8 percent higher compared to Mason’s 2011-12. When these stats are
utilized in the regression findings, we would expect the Blue Jackets winning percentage to
increase drastically when Bobrovsky became the starting goalie. Exhibit 11 shows the

23
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estimations of Bobrovsky’s impact on the team’s winning percentage compared to Steve
Mason. For ease of calculation we will treat the calculations as if each goaltender played
every game of the season for the team.
Exhibit 11: Estimated Point Percentage Change Attributable to Sergei Bobrovsky
Regression Equation 1
Regression Equation 2
Sv Pct
Sv Pct
Exp. Point Pct
Sv Pct
Sv Pct
Exp. Point Pct
Diff
Coef
Change
Diff
Coef
Change
Estimate 1
3.3%
3.661
12.1
3.3%
3.405
11.2
Estimate 2
3.8%
3.661
13.9
3.8%
3.405
12.9
Source: Appendix A & Exhibit 10

In Exhibit 11, estimate 1 uses the difference between Bobrovsky’s 2012-13 save percentage
and Mason’s 2012-13 save percentage while estimate 2 uses the difference between
Bobrovsky’s 2012-13 save percentage and Steve Mason’s 2011-12 save percentage.
Estimate 1 is a better indicator of the value in terms of point percentage Bobrovsky added
because it directly compares the goaltenders playing behind the same team. The estimates
show Bobrovsky increased the team’s expected point percentage by between 11.2 and 13.9
percent. With the team earning 39.6% of the possible points in 2011-12 the team’s point
percentage would be expected to increase to between 50.8% and 53.5% had Bobrovsky
played every game of the 2012-13 season. In fact, the team earned 55 of a possible 96
points during the 2012-13 season, or 57.3% of the teams possible points. This means that
although Bobrovsky added significant value to the Blue Jackets in terms of winning
percentage, the increased production provided by the acquisition of Dubinsky and
Anisimov (2 good players) for Rick Nash (1 great player) likely affected the team’s success
positively. The trade provided the Blue Jackets with greater depth and may be a model for
other small market teams with one or two all-star caliber players but not much team depth
beyond their top player or line.
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Even though the Blue Jackets saw their point percentage increase by 17.7% from the
2011-12 season to the 2012-13 season, they missed the playoffs. The Blue Jackets tied with
the Minnesota Wild for the eighth and final playoff spot in the Western Conference at 55
points apiece. The Wild won the tiebreaker, wins excluding shootout wins, eliminating the
Blue Jackets from a chance to win the Stanley Cup. Although, the Blue Jackets failed to reach
the playoffs the strong and sudden improvement of team performance is worth studying
for NHL general managers.

Case Study 4: Stanley Cup Finalists from Past Six Seasons
Ultimate success in the NHL is winning the Stanley Cup, therefore the Stanley Cup
finalists will be analyzed to determine their performance in the statistics studied compared
to the performance of all teams. The teams studied are listed in Exhibit 12.
Exhibit 12: Past Six Stanley Cup Finals
Year
Champion
Runner-Up
2012-13
Chicago Blackhawks
Boston Bruins
2011-12
Los Angeles Kings
New Jersey Devils
2010-11
Boston Bruins
Vancouver Canucks
2009-10
Chicago Blackhawks
Philadelphia Flyers
2008-09
Pittsburgh Penguins
Detroit Red Wings
2007-08
Detroit Red Wings
Pittsburgh Penguins

The data from these twelve teams was compiled (See Appendix B). Descriptive
statistics of this data set are shown in Exhibit 13.
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Exhibit 13: Descriptive Statistics of Stanley Cup Finalists
Point Percentage
Takeaways per Game
Mean
65.167 Mean
Standard Deviation
6.994 Standard Deviation
Minimum
53.700 Minimum
Maximum
80.200 Maximum
Shooting Percentage
Turnovers per Game
Mean
7.962 Mean
Standard Deviation
0.830 Standard Deviation
Minimum
6.350 Minimum
Maximum
9.490 Maximum
Save Percentage
Corsi Percentage
Mean
92.446 Mean
Standard Deviation
0.876 Standard Deviation
Minimum
90.720 Minimum
Maximum
93.420 Maximum
Faceoff Percentage
Fenwick Percentage
Mean
51.558 Mean
Standard Deviation
3.154 Standard Deviation
Minimum
46.100 Minimum
Maximum
56.400 Maximum

6.508
1.356
5.170
9.730
7.633
0.830
6.610
9.390
53.400
4.131
45.200
59.500
53.567
3.852
46.400
59.700

Source: Appendix B

When compared to the descriptive statistics of the original data set (Exhibit 4), some
interesting patterns emerge. We would expect the mean of every statistic to increase with
the exception of turnovers per game. The mean point percentage of Stanley Cup Finalists is
over 9 percent higher than the average NHL team. This is important, as over half the teams
in the NHL make the playoffs, meaning teams near the average point percentage can in
theory win the Stanley Cup. The idea that a general manager’s goal is to create a playoff
caliber team and that once they reach the playoffs anything can happen is central to Billy
Beane’s management style in baseball.24 The 2009-10 Philadelphia Flyers seem to support
Beane’s idea of the playoffs, as their 53.7 percent point percentage was lower than average,
but earned them the eighth spot in the Eastern Conference that year. The team reached the
Stanley Cup Final despite their below-average regular season before losing to the Chicago
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Lewis, Michael. 2003
29

Blackhawks. However, closer examination shows teams that win the Stanley Cup have done
far more than merely perform good enough to reach the playoffs. The lowest winning
percentage for a Stanley Cup winning team in the past six years belonged to the 2011-12
Los Angeles Kings at 57.9 percent. While the Flyers and Kings were around the average in
their Stanley Cup Final years, the remainder of the Stanley Cup Finalists from the 2007-08
to 2012-13 seasons all achieved point percentages above 60 percent, 4 percent higher than
the overall average point percentage. When evaluated as a group the Stanley Cup Finalists
averaged a 65.2% point percentage, much higher than the overall point percentage average
of 55.9%, which would in theory make the playoffs. Therefore, Beane’s attitude that
analytics should be used only to get a playoff team at which point randomness prevails
does not seem to transfer from baseball to hockey.
Also of interest are the Fenwick and Corsi percentages of Stanley Cup Finalist Teams
compared to the overall average. Other than point percentage, these are the statistics that
the mean value of Stanley Cup Finalists differs the most from the overall average. The mean
Corsi percentage for Stanley Cup Finalists is 53.4 percent while the overall average is just
under 50 percent. Similarly, Stanley Cup Finalists achieve a Fenwick percentage of 53.6
percent while the overall average is again just under 50 percent. Using these percentages
as puck possession proxies once again, we can assume Stanley Cup Finalists posses the
puck about 3.5% more than the average NHL team. The only teams to achieve Fenwick
and/or Corsi percentages under 50 percent and still reach the Stanley Cup Finals were the
2007-08 and 2008-09 Pittsburgh Penguins. The 2007-08 team lost to Detroit in the finals
after achieving a Corsi percentage of 45.2 and a Fenwick percentage of 46.4 during the
regular season. Their subpar puck possession proxies were likely offset by a high shooting
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percentage of 8.5, the third highest among all Stanley Cup Finalists studied. Similarly, the
2008-09 Penguins achieved a Corsi percentage of only 49.2, while the team’s Fenwick
percentage was above the overall average at 50.1 percent. The Penguins avenged their
finals loss from the previous year by defeating the Detroit Red Wings. The 2008-09
Penguins achieved the best shooting percentage of any Stanley Cup Finalist studied at just
under 9.5 percent, which likely offset the team’s relatively average puck possession.
As a whole, Stanley Cup Finalists perform better in the regular season than the NHL
average, which generally is considered as a playoff team. However, this is not to say a team
with a point percentage that far exceeds the NHL average will also be above average in each
performance statistic studied. The study of Stanley Cup Finalists seems to suggest that the
most successful teams are able to offset areas of the team that are average with other areas
that are extremely strong. In addition, the 2009-10 Flyers show there is an element of
randomness, momentum, and chemistry, all intrinsic to hockey that carry over from
regular season play to the playoffs.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Interpretation of Findings
Four different performance statistics showed a positive and significant correlation
to team success, measured in terms of point percentage. The first regression tested showed
Fenwick percentage, shot percentage, and save percentage as reliable indicators of team
performance. The second regression replaced Fenwick percentage with Corsi percentage
with the results showing Corsi percentage, shot percentage, and save percentage as
relevant indicators of a team’s success. From these two regressions we can draw some
meaningful conclusions for NHL general managers attempting to put together the most
competitive team possible. First, both puck possession proxies (Fenwick and Corsi) are
positively correlated with team success. This shows these metrics are valuable tools to
evaluating players, although some NHL general managers disagree.25
Similarly, capitalization percentages such as shot percentage and save percentage
have a major impact on the success of a team as evidenced by the results of both
regressions. Anecdotal evidence from Case Study 1 supports these findings as the
Pittsburgh Penguins and the Sports Analytics Institute used “conversion rate” to determine
James Neal was worth more in reality than his market value would have led others to
believe. Case Study 2 shows the importance of drafting well, the use of the AHL, and
capitalizing on players still on their entry-level contracts while making significant
contributions in terms of puck possession proxies, shooting percentage, and ultimately
points. Although the Blackhawks were unable to retain the services of some crucial players
from their 2010 Stanley Cup Championship Team, the organization replaced them in a span
25
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of three years with entry-level players such as Nick Leddy and Brandon Saad to win
another Stanley Cup in 2013.
Case Study 3 shows how star players might be over valued in the trade or free agent
market. Although Rick Nash led the Columbus Blue Jackets in points, the team did not have
the depth to realistically compete for a playoff spot in 2011-12. By trading Nash to acquire
more depth, the Blue Jackets were able to improve puck possession and ultimately
performance. In addition, the acquisition of goaltender Sergei Bobrovsky and the difference
he made on the team’s save percentage made a large impact on the team’s performance,
ultimately contributing to the Blue Jackets improving their point percentage by over 17
percent.

Conclusion
In conclusion, both sabermetrics and traditional statistics are useful for evaluating
team performance. Fenwick, Corsi, shot percentage, and save percentage are all statistics
NHL general managers should consider when making personnel decisions. These statistics
have the potential to highlight players that will impact the team’s point percentage greatly,
even though the market does not value a player as highly. The introduction of entry-level
contract limits in the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement has provided general
managers a great tool to increase a team’s success with a minimal cap hit. This is evident in
the success of the Chicago Blackhawks over the past 4 NHL seasons as well as by the
improvement of the Columbus Blue Jackets, arguably due to the acquisition of entry-level
goaltender Sergei Bobrovsky. The quality of players signed in free agency or acquired in
trades has been shown to work in both ways. In Case Study 2 the depth of the Chicago
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Blackhawks and contributions of entry-level players Jonathan Toews and Patrick Kane in
the 2009-10 season allowed high priced and high quality free agent signings Brian
Campbell and Marian Hossa to increase team success. However, Case Study 3 shows how a
team with one great player can achieve more success by trading him for several good
players and increasing team depth. Although the Blue Jackets lost Rick Nash, they added
Brandon Dubinsky, Artem Anisimov, and Sergei Bobrovsky for roughly the same price as
Nash would have cost them. This shows how in some situations it is to the team’s benefit to
acquire several players for the price of one all-star caliber player. The general manager
must be able to determine the amount of depth on his team and determine what areas need
to be improved.
The findings of this study help to show how a general manager can determine what
trade-offs are necessary to improve his team’s success. Case Study 4 shows that as a whole,
teams who make the Stanley Cup Finals are far better than teams who merely make the
playoffs even during the regular season. This means Billy Beane’s theory for baseball, that
once the playoffs start all teams have an equal chance to win the title, does not hold true in
hockey. In addition, the study shows the most successful NHL teams are able to offset their
average or below average areas with at least one exceptionally strong area.
There are limitations to this study. First of all, it is hard to determine exactly how
the rule changes in the NHL CBA agreed to in January of 2013 will impact the market. This
is because the season was limited to 48 games and the statistics from the recently opened
2013-14 season were not included in the study. In addition, the impact of the 2005 NHL
CBA on general managers decision-making was limited because the sabermetric statistics
of Fenwick and Corsi could not be collected prior to the start of the 2007-08 season. The
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true impacts of a single free agent signing or trade is very hard to calculate due to the fact
that hockey is largely based on teamwork and chemistry, these variable are difficult to
measure, which may account for variance in a player’s or team’s performance from year to
year.

Suggestions for Further Research
In conclusion, the analytical approach to studying hockey is effective and many NHL
general managers are using sabermetric principles in their decision-making. However, the
scientific study of hockey is in its infancy and needs to be further studied. Notable areas
that should be studied further include shot quality and scoring chances. Further study in
these areas will allow for a better understanding of goal scoring potential for forwards and
defensemen as well as a better measurement for goal prevention for defensemen and
especially goaltenders. Possession time studies for each zone (offensive, defensive, and
neutral) can also give more insight into exactly how puck possession plays a role in
winning hockey games. For example, how does the zone in which a team has the puck
impact success and how does it compare to the fact their opponent does not have it? In
order to help evaluate players for the draft and those in the minors, further study should be
completed on how performance statistics of players in junior leagues, the college ranks,
and the AHL translate to success in the NHL.
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Appendix A
Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-180
Dependent variable: PP
coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
--------------------------------------------------------const −398.731 34.2680 −11.64 1.75e-23 ***
FP
1.61741 0.117663 13.75 1.54e-29 ***
FOP
0.142324 0.184451 0.7716 0.4414
SP
3.83129 0.393865 9.727 4.11e-18 ***
SVP
3.66129 0.358575 10.21 1.87e-19 ***
TOG
0.130247 0.190264 0.6846 0.4945
TAG
−0.265880 0.249424 −1.066 0.2879
Mean dependent var 55.85833 S.D. dependent var 7.963084
Sum squared resid 3392.943 S.E. of regression 4.428588
R-squared
0.701076 Adjusted R-squared 0.690709
F(6, 173)
67.62370 P-value(F)
8.31e-43
Log-likelihood −519.6936 Akaike criterion 1053.387
Schwarz criterion 1075.738 Hannan-Quinn
1062.449
Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 19 (TOpG)
Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-180
Dependent variable:
PP
coefficient std. error t-ratio p-value
---------------------------------------------------------const −367.927
36.1240 −10.19 2.21e-19 ***
CP
1.50505 0.123913 12.15 6.05e-25 ***
FOP
0.150215 0.198178 0.7580 0.4495
SP
3.72135 0.417818 8.907 7.07e-16 ***
SVP
3.40541 0.379837 8.965 4.91e-16 ***
TOG
0.0593116 0.201874 0.2938 0.7693
TAG
−0.353920 0.264558 −1.338 0.1827
Mean dependent var 55.85833 S.D. dependent var 7.963084
Sum squared resid 3831.509 S.E. of regression 4.706108
R-squared
0.662438 Adjusted R-squared 0.650730
F(6, 173)
56.58295 P-value(F)
2.74e-38
Log-likelihood −530.6341 Akaike criterion 1075.268
Schwarz criterion 1097.619 Hannan-Quinn
1084.330
Excluding the constant, p-value was highest for variable 19 (TOpG)
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Appendix B

Team
2012-13
2012-13
2011-12
2011-12
2010-11
2010-11
2009-10
2009-10
2008-09
2008-09
2007-08
2007-08

BOSTON
CHICAGO
LOS ANGELES
NEW JERSEY
BOSTON
VANCOUVER
CHICAGO
PHILADELPHIA
DETROIT
PITTSBURGH
DETROIT
PITTSBURGH

Point
Pct
64.6
80.2
57.9
62.2
62.8
71.3
68.3
53.7
68.3
60.4
70.1
62.2

Stanley Cup Finalists from Past Six Seasons
Goals per
GA per
Shots per
SA
FO
Fenwic
Game
Game
Game
per G
Pct
k Pct
2.65
2.21
32.4
28.6
56.4
54.5
3.1
2.02
31.1
26.2
50.8
56.1
2.29
2.07
30.6
27.4
51.5
53.7
2.63
2.5
27.5
26.8
47.1
51.1
2.98
2.3
32.9
32.7
51.9
50.8
3.15
2.2
32
30.1
54.9
53.5
3.2
2.48
34.1
25.1
52.4
58.1
2.83
2.71
31.6
28.6
50.1
51.3
3.52
2.93
36.2
27.7
55.1
57.5
3.15
2.84
29
30.3
49.1
50.1
3.07
2.18
34.4
23.5
53.3
59.7
2.93
2.58
27.7
30.8
46.1
46.4

Corsi
Pct
55
55.4
54.9
51
51.1
53.7
56.9
50.5
58.4
49.2
59.5
45.2

Shot
Pct
8.18
8.29
6.35
6.93
8.41
7.86
8.69
7.48
7.61
9.49
7.75
8.5

Save
Pct
93.31
92.41
93.38
92.14
93.42
93.38
90.72
92.23
91.45
92.86
91.6
92.45

TO
Game
8.38
7.19
9.39
7.71
6.61
6.77
6.71
8.1
7.43
7.96
8.27
7.07

Source: NHL.com; stats.hockeyanalysis.com
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TA
Game
5.79
9.73
5.51
5.93
5.17
7.27
8.33
6.82
5.43
5.71
6.54
5.87

